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ABSTRACT
We study a general equilibrium model of trade with two goods and many countries
where each country sets its distortionary tariff noncooperatively to maximize the payoff of
the representative household. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria by
showing that there are consistent bounds on tariff rates that are common across countries
and that payoff functions in the induced game are quasiconcave. Separately, we show
that best responses are strictly increasing functions, and provide robust examples that
show that the game need not be supermodular. The fact that a country’s payoff does not
respond monotonically to increases in a competitor’s tariff rate, shows that the standard
condition in the literature for payoff comparisons across Nash equilibria fails in our model.
We then show that the participation of at most two countries in negotiated tariff changes
suffices to induce a Pareto improving allocation relative to a Nash equilibrium. Further
results provided concern the location of the best response in relation to the free trade
point, the monotonicity of payoffs, and the bounds on equilibrium strategies. The final
result is that there is no trade if and only if the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ability to impose a tariff is arguably the tool most commonly used by a government
to influence foreign trade. This is done to benefit the country as it moves the equilibrium
allocation in an appropriate direction away from free trade. Since retaliation is only to be
expected, the resulting strategic equilibrium becomes the object of analysis; importantly,
the allocation induced is, quite generally, inefficient.2 This sets the stage for a role for
institutions that regulate and promote international trade to attempt to mitigate the
inefficiency by facilitating the negotiation of multilateral agreements.3 The heterogeneity
across countries, particularly in terms of their relative size and tastes, is likely to play a key
role in the determination of the rules of multilateral engagement used by these institutions
to achieve the desired mitigation. An essential element of any analysis that provides the
foundation for such rules would be to clarify the manner in which heterogeneity interacts
with the number of countries in consideration, and our aim is to contribute to that analysis.
We study a model with many countries in which the prices that domestic agents
face are the world prices distorted by a tariff, and where the revenue from the tariff is
distributed by the government to the agents as a lump-sum transfer. Trade in competitive
markets results in the determination of world prices for goods in general equilibrium, and
each government acts noncooperatively to set tariff rates to maximize the utility of the
agents. The equilibrium concept used is pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The literature on optimal tariffs in the presence of retaliation has drawn attention
to the importance of solving for the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game.4
However, the quote from Costinot, Rodriguez-Clare, and Werning (2016), who present
a parametric “new trade model” and study the problem faced by a single country, that
“future research should strive to characterize the Nash equilibrium in which all countries
attempt to manipulate their terms of trade,” confirms the paucity of results on existence
and characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Our paper contributes to the literature by studying a tractable multi-country frame-
work; it addresses the issue of the existence of a Nash equilibrium and also provides
qualitative results, and it does so analytically rather than numerically/computationally.5
Our model is sufficiently general in that we do not impose any restrictions on trade
2See Johnson (1953) for the two country and two good exchange model. He presents a geometric
analysis and provides an analytical treatment of the special case of constant elasticity offer curves wherein
reaction functions are horizontal or vertical straight lines. He concludes that a tariff may be welfare
improving even with retaliation. Gorman (1958) provides a more detailed consideration of the constant
elasticity case for the same model.
3The recent survey by Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2016) provides a comprehensive appraisal of that
argument and the rapidly developing empirical analysis that provides support or reason for scepticism.
Costinot, Rodriguez-Clare, and Werning (2016) confirm the role of the terms of trade externalities in
motivating international trade agreements.
4This is noted in the survey by Costinot and Rodriquez-Clare (2014).
5Hamilton and Whalley (1983) is an early contribution that recognized the computational difficulties
that arise as soon as one steps beyond the two country and two good framework. That the issue remains
unresolved is recognized in Abrego et al (2005, 2006).
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patterns and we are able to characterize the equilibrium in terms of conditions on coun-
tries’ endowments. This is in contrast to the literature where results can often be traced
to simplifying assumptions, like symmetry, on the structure of the model.6
Evidently, the introduction of tariffs enriches the model whilst creating additional
technical difficulties. Sontheimer (1971) draws on Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) to note
that if some good is not normal then, in the presence of a tariff, the demand set could
fail to be convex. Hence, existence of a general equilibrium requires that in each country
every good is normal. It is also clear that continuity of behaviour and payoffs requires
that, given tariff rates, the Walrasian equilibrium is unique. These two requirements
immediately restrict the set of economies that one can work with. In addition one must
face the main difficulty in proving existence of Nash equilibrium in such a framework: one
has to establish that each payoff function is quasiconcave in the player’s own choice.
In view of the technical problems that the richness of the model forces us to confront,
there is a trade-off in how general a model one can work with. We would also like to
adopt a framework that allows the theory to be taken to the data. The linear expenditure
system, which has been fruitfully applied in many areas, and preferences that generate it,
provides a compromise that is an attractive specification for a model of tariffs. The fact
that these generalized Cobb-Douglas preferences induce a demand function that is the
same as the aggregate demand function induced by heterogeneous agents with sufficiently
heterogeneously distributed characteristics (see Grandmont (1992)) is a bonus.
We consider an exchange economy with an arbitrary number of countries and with
two goods. Preferences are restricted to be in the Cobb-Douglas class but are otherwise
arbitrary—no assumptions of symmetry are made and countries are allowed to be different.
Endowments are also arbitrary other than being nonnegative.
We study noncooperative tariff equilibria in the induced strategic form game.
We first show that if for each good at least two countries have a positive endowment
of the good, a mild assumption, then there are common upper and lower bounds on tariff
rates such that no country’s best response is on the boundary of the strategy sets that are
induced. These bounds are consistent in that all potential equilibrium points are interior.
We then show that if at least two countries have a positive endowment of the good
on which the tariff is imposed then each country’s payoff function has the property that
its second derivative is negative at any point at which the first derivative of the function
is zero. When combined with the behaviour of the payoff function at the boundaries
of the strategy sets, the local second order property ensures that the payoff function is
quasiconcave. That suffices to prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Next we show that the tariff game is a game of strategic complementarity as the
best response functions are strictly increasing. We also provide robust examples to show
6For example, Ossa (2011) considers a two and a three country model with identical preferences,
identical technology, tariffs that do not generate revenue, and a positive transportation cost. It is then
shown that there is a unique Nash equilibrium with identical tariffs set at the highest possible value which
is exogenously chosen. Also see footnotes 9 and 10.
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that the game can fail to be supermodular; it follows that the existence proof cannot
be simplified by appealing directly to lattice theory, a simplification that would make
redundant the difficult step in which we verify quasiconcavity.7
We then use the properties developed to provide results on payoff comparisons that
culminate in a policy implication. We show that, in our model, a country’s payoff increases
when a competitor raises its tariff if and only if the country has set a positive net tariff rate.
Therefore, the standard condition in the literature under which payoff comparisons across
Nash equilibria become possible must be violated in our model since that condition (which
is not implied by supermodularity) requires that the country’s payoff always responds in
the same direction whenever a competitor raises its tariff. We then show that a country’s
payoff increases as we move away from the free trade point in either direction along the
best response. We are also able to show that the following surprising result holds very
generally: the participation of at most two countries in negotiated tariff changes suffices
to induce a Pareto improving allocation relative to a Nash equilibrium with the direction
of tariff rate change easily determined; this is despite the fact that changing any tariff rate
affects the payoff of every country. In view of the fact that our model is parametric and can
therefore be easily taken to the data, this result on welfare improvements has the potential
to play an important role in policy deliberations in the current global environment where
large economies are adopting protectionist measures.
We also provide results that relate the position of a country’s best response function to
the trade pattern in the absence of tariffs, and that specify lower bounds on the arithmetic
and harmonic means of equilibrium tariff rates; this last result implies that there is at
most one symmetric equilibrium and it must be free trade. Our final result is that there is
no trade if and only if the equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal. We then comment on
the extent to which comparative statics exercises can be carried out, and on the possibility
of obtaining a result on uniqueness.
We reiterate that our analysis is free of any restrictions on trade patterns and our
minimal assumptions are transparent since they are on the fundamentals of the economy
and not on elasticities. We observe that, although a key goal of this literature is to
determine the welfare effects of the introduction of noncooperative tariffs, we do not
pursue that goal analytically. This is because we know from Kennan and Riezman (1988)
that, even in the two country world with identical symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences,
the pattern of endowments determines one of the three outcomes—there is a cigar shaped
region around the line of slope −1 that delineates a region in which, in Nash equilibrium,
both lose relative to free trade, and outside the region the bigger country wins.8
One imagines that in our model with many countries welfare effects of tariffs will
7On the other hand, in a Ricardian production model without consumers or tariff considerations,
Costinot (2009) provides strong predictions on comparative advantage by assuming logsupermodularity
of functions specifying the linear technology and endowments.
8In a two country Ricardian model with identical Cobb-Douglas preferences, Opp (2010) shows that
the relative size of the country determines the outcome of a tariff war.
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depend intricately on the combination of preference parameters and endowments. This
suggests the use of numerical methods which are placed on firmer ground since in our
tariff games solutions to the first order conditions characterize all possible interior pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
One must ask whether our framework is too restrictive. In the literature one sometimes
finds expression of the belief that the issue of the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria
in the general model described has been settled; yet, as we now argue, very little is known
about it.9 Wong (2004) considers the 2 × 2 (two good and two country) pure exchange
model and provides an example to show that existence can fail if for some country, and a
tariff rate set by the other country, the country’s offer curve fails to enclose a convex set;
this confirms that the result in Otani (1980) on the existence of compensated equilibrium
in a general model with production is driven by his Assumption 11 (b), one that he refers
to as “most uneasy”, which convexifies the problem. Wong (2004) then proves existence
with the normal goods assumption and the assumption that the area enclosed by each
offer curve is a convex set for each level of the tariff chosen by the opponent, and makes the
argument that his proof cannot be extended to the case with more than two countries.10
The first order conditions of the 2 × 2 pure exchange economy with Cobb-Douglas
preferences have been studied by Otani (1980) as an example, and by Kennan and Riezman
(1988) who revisit Johnson’s original question and provide the solution described earlier.11
To summarize, the existence results that are known require strong restrictions and are
not known to extend to the case with more than two countries.12
We make one final comment. A trivial modification, which amounts to no more than
relabelling the variables, allows one to view the model as one of multiple tax jurisdictions.
Once local tax rates are set and treated as parameters, a standard Walrasian equilibrium
is played. Our model provides an “off-the-shelf” well-received parametric framework in
which existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is guaranteed and in which qualitative
as well as quantitative analysis can be easily carried out.
We present the model in Section 2, and discuss, in order, existence in Section 3, strate-
gic complementarity in Section 4, and properties of the solution in Section 5. Concluding
comments are in Section 6, and all proofs are collected in Section 7.
9Kuga (1973) studies equilibrium in mixed strategies with finite sets of choices in a production economy.
10Thursby and Jensen (1983), Syropoulos (2002), and Wong (2004), all provide sufficient conditions, in
terms of elasticities, for the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in two country models, typically with
strong assumptions on preferences. Zissimos (2009) argues that quasiconcavity of the payoff function can
be established in the case of symmetric Cobb-Douglas preferences in a model with two groups of countries
where groups are internally homogeneous.
11Kennan and Riezman (1988) consider the case with identical and symmetric preferences and aggregate
endowment normalized to one while Kennan and Riezman (1984) consider nonidentical and asymmetric
preferences. It is not clear that the analytics for reaction functions can be meaningfully extended to
more than 2 countries. Kennan and Riezman (1990) provide numerical solutions for the 3× 3 case with
identical symmetric preferences and different endowment specifications.
12The model in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) has reduced form payoff functions that depend on domestic
and world relative prices. They directly assume that the required second order conditions hold (see their
footnote 9). The same model is used for expository purposes in Bagwell, Bown, and Staiger (2016).
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2.1 THE ECONOMY
Consider a world with two goods and a set I = {1, 2, · · · , I} of countries. The goods
are traded in international markets at prices p1 > 0 and p2 > 0 (later we set p1 = 1). The
government in each country sets a nondiscriminatory tariff on each good; the gross tariff
rates are denoted τi1 and τi2 for each i ∈ I. We impose the restriction that the gross
tariff rates are always positive, τi1 > 0 and τi2 > 0 for each i ∈ I. The tariffs τi1 and
τi2 induce a vector of domestic prices (τi1p1, τi2p2) in country i and the revenue generated
by the tariffs depends linearly on the net trade vector; the proceeds from the tariffs are
redistributed to consumers in country i in the form of a lump-sum.
The representative consumer in each country has an endowment, denoted ωi ∈ R2+/{0}
for i ∈ I, and behaves competitively when faced with the vector of domestic prices
(τi1p1, τi2p2) in country i. The quantities of each good demanded by the consumer in
country i are denoted xi1 and xi2. Let wi denote the income available to the consumer in
country i. It follows that the budget constraint faced by consumer i is
τi1p1xi1 + τi2p2xi2 ≤ wi.
Also, the revenue generated by the tariffs is given by
(τi1 − 1)p1(xi1 − ωi1) + (τi2 − 1)p2(xi2 − ωi2),
and since tariff revenues are redistributed in the form of a lump-sum, we have
wi = τi1p1ωi1 + τi2p2ωi2 + (τi1 − 1)p1(xi1 − ωi1) + (τi2 − 1)p2(xi2 − ωi2)
= (τi1 − 1)p1xi1 + (τi2 − 1)p2xi2 + p1ωi1 + p2ωi2.
We shall assume that the consumer in country i has a utility function ui of the Cobb-
Douglas form, so ui(xi1, xi2) = xi1
αixi2
1−αi , with parameter αi ∈ (0, 1).
We also make the nondegeneracy assumptions:
∑
i ωi1 > 0 and
∑
i ωi2 > 0.
For ease of reference we collect the assumptions made so far; these will be treated as
maintained assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 1: (i) For all i ∈ I, ωi ∈ R2+/{0} and ui(xi1, xi2) = xi1αixi21−αi , with
parameter αi ∈ (0, 1);
(ii)
∑
i ωi1 > 0 and
∑
i ωi2 > 0.
The optimization problem faced by i taking p1, p2, τi1, and τi2 as given is
max xi1
αixi2
1−αi subject to τi1p1xi1 + τi2p2xi2 ≤ wi.





xi1 τi1p1xi1 + τi2p2xi2 = wi.
Demand xi1(p1, p2, τi1, τi2) can now be calculated by observing that the budget constraint
simplifies to
p1xi1 + p2xi2 = p1ωi1 + p2ωi2.




xi1 = p1ωi1+p2ωi2 ⇐⇒ p1
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Clearly, we can normalize prices and set p1 = 1. Also, the tariff rates set by each
country affect prices only through the ratios of the tariffs on the two goods. Therefore,
we may work with the variables τi = τi2/τi1. From here onwards we set the gross tariff
rate on the first good in each country at one, and work with a single tariff rate, that on
the second good, chosen by each country; this is without loss of generality. The notation
τi is used from here on to denote the strategic variable chosen by country i.
Let ~τ = (τ1, τ2, · · · , τI). For αi ∈ (0, 1) and τi > 0, set A(αi, τi) := αiτiαiτi+(1−αi) .












We have an explicit analytical expression for the market clearing international relative
price as a function of the tariff rates set by each of the countries and the parameters
specifying economic fundamentals ((αi, ωi)i∈I). Assumption 1 guarantees that both the
numerator and the denominator are positive and finite, i.e. p∗2 (~τ) ∈ (0,+∞). Also,
consumption of good 1 in country i at equilibrium prices is xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) = A(αi, τi)[ωi1 +
p∗2 (~τ)ωi2].
Before proceeding further, we collect a few remarks on the model. Notice that the
budget constraint takes the form
p1xi1 + τip2xi2 ≤ p1ωi1 + τip2ωi2 + (τi − 1)p2(xi2 − ωi2).
Trade is free if τi = 1 in every country. Also, the tariff generates revenue if τi > 1 and
country i is an importer of good 2 or if τi < 1 and country i is an exporter of good 2.
13
Since we provide analytical results, our restriction to Cobb-Douglas utility functions is
driven by considerations of tractability. It should be noted that the analysis in Grandmont
(1992) can be applied directly to our model to provide conditions on the distribution
of characteristics that would generate Cobb-Douglas like demands in a pure exchange
endowment economy.
2.2 THE INDUCED UTILITY FUNCTION
Utility at the Walrasian equilibium obtained above can now be calculated and labelled
the “induced utility function” for country i. More precisely, given a vector of tariff
13We do not impose the condition “τi > 1 if and only if country i is a net importer of good 2”. In
doing so, we follow much of the literature, e.g. Otani (1980) and Kennan and Riezman (1988); Wong
(2004) does impose the restriction.
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rates, vi : RI++ → R denotes the utility achieved by each country at the market clearing







We begin our analysis by studying the function vi. Lemma 1 provides an explicit
form for vi and its first derivative with respect to τi. Evidently, vi is well defined and
continuously differentiable.
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The term within brackets in Lemma 1 (ii) will play an important role since it is easy
to show that its sign is the same as the sign of the partial derivative.
2.3 CONSISTENT BOUNDS
We specify mild conditions that ensure that at low enough values of the tariff rate set
by country i (and no lower tariff rates set by any other country), the function vi(~τ) is
increasing in τi, and that it is decreasing in τi at high enough values of the tariff rate set
by country i (and no higher tariff rates set by any other country). A pair of such tariff
rates, denoted τ and τ , where ∞ > τ > τ > 0, is used as boundary points to induce
strategy sets by restricting the tariff rate set by country i to satisfy τ ≥ τi ≥ τ .
Not only are the induced strategy sets compact, they are also consistent because
Lemma 2 implies that if τ̃i /∈ (τ , τ) for a profile of actions τ−i := ((τj)j 6=i), then, for some
j ∈ I, ∂vj
∂τj
(τ̃j, τ−j) 6= 0. In addition, Lemma 2 and continuity of ∂vi∂τi (~τ) ensure that when
τj ∈ [τ , τ ] for all j 6= i, there is at least one value τ̃i ∈ (τ , τ) such that ∂vi∂τi (τ̃i, τ−i) = 0. The
alternative of a strategy set where a maximizer exists but is on the boundary, and the
derivative of the objective function at the maximizer is not zero, is not palatable in that
changing the bound would change the solution and hence the putative Nash equilibrium.
LEMMA 2: (i) If ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all
τ ∈ (0, τ ], for all i ∈ I, ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0 for τ−i ∈ [τ ,∞)I−1; (ii) if ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I
then there exists τ > 1 such that, for all τ ∈ [τ ,∞), for all i ∈ I, ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) < 0 for
τ−i ∈ (0, τ ]I−1.
We observe that the conditions imposed in Lemma 2 are very mild: we require that
for each good it is the case that at least two countries have a positive endowment of the
good. As the example in Section 2.5 shows, the condition imposed in (i) is tight.




, for l = 1, 2; now it
easily follows that there are values τ and τ that, respectively, satisfy the inequalities
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where α := mini∈I αi and α := maxi∈I αi, where 0 < α ≤ α < 1. (The corresponding
inequalities are satisfied by any pair τ and τ such that τ ∈ (0, τ ] and τ ∈ [τ ,∞), re-
spectively.) The proof of Lemma 2 consists in showing that when τ and τ satisfy the
inequalities, the properties asserted in the statement of Lemma 2 follow; since the values
are independent of the characteristics of the economy, they serve as uniform bounds.
Evidently, when all countries have identical preferences then the infimum of the set of
values τ that satisfy the inequality is 1 + ωī1∑
j 6=ī ωj1
where ī is the country with the largest
endowment of the first good. This provides a simple upper bound for equilibrium tariff
rates independent of the country; there is a corresponding lower bound. So our model
has the following interesting implication: when countries have similar tastes, unless some
country is quite literally very large, equilibrium tariff rates will be close to one.
Tighter, and so more informative bounds, are also available. The proof of Lemma 2









j 6=i [1− A(αj, τ)]ωj1∑
j [1− A(αj, τ)]ωj1
.
Clearly, the bounds, including the uniform ones, are available even when tastes vary; it
follows that they provide an easy test of whether Nash equilibrium behaviour is observed.14
2.4 THE TARIFF GAME
The tariff game is a game in strategic form specified by the player set I, the strategy
set [τ , τ ] for each i, and the payoff functions (v1(~τ), · · · , vI(~τ)) which restrict the induced
utility functions vi to [τ , τ ]
I .
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the tariff game is an action profile (τ ∗1 , · · · , τ ∗I ) ∈
[τ , τ ]I , such that
for each i ∈ I τi ∈ [τ , τ ] ⇒ vi(τ ∗i , τ ∗−i) ≥ vi(τi, τ ∗−i).
A strategy profile is interior if (τ1, · · · , τI) ∈ (τ , τ)I .
The discussion preceeding Lemma 2 confirms that a profile of actions in which τi /∈
(τ , τ) for some i cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
2.5 AN EXAMPLE
We present an example to show that the bounds specified in Lemma 2 are tight.
Consider a two country world. Let country 2’s endowment of the second good be 0,
ω22 = 0, in particular ω2 /∈ R2++. For given tariff rates the Walrasian equilibrium is always
well-defined. Yet, the tariff game does not have an interior Nash equilibrium. To see this,
use Lemma 1 (ii) to obtain the sign of ∂v1
∂τ1





j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− α1 · ω12∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
14Of course, high tariffs observed in data from actual economies might correspond to punitive measures
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since ω21 > 0 necessarily as ω22 = 0 and ωi ∈ R2+/ {0}. This shows that regardless of
the vector of tariffs chosen, country’s 1’s first order condition can never have an interior
solution.
The example does not restrict ω1 or preferences.
3. EXISTENCE
Our objective in this section is to investigate the conditions for the existence of a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in the tariff game. Lemma 1 in Section 2.2 established that
the function vi is well defined and continuously differentiable; however, vi typically fails
to be concave. By requiring the second derivative of the payoff function to be negative at
every point at which the first derivative is zero, and also requiring the payoff function to
be increasing at the left boundary and decreasing at the right boundary, we are able to
ensure the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium.
Clearly, we must study the local behaviour of the payoff function at a point at which
the first derivative is zero. Lemma 3 in Section 3.1 provides a very simple explicit algebraic
form to determine the sign of the second partial derivative of the payoff function at such
a point. This result is used in Lemma 4 to establish that, in our tariff games, either of
αi ≤ 1/2 or ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1, the mild condition already encountered in Lemma 2 (i), suffice to
ensure that the sign of the second partial derivative of the payoff function is negative at
every point at which the first derivative is zero.
The properties of the function vi established in Lemma 1, 2, and 4 lead to Theorem 1
in Section 3.2 which identifies mild conditions on the primitives of the model that ensure
the existence of an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the tariff game.
3.1 THE BEST RESPONSE
In this sub-section we study the local behaviour of the payoff function at points at
which its first derivative is zero. Using the fact that at a strategy profile at which the first
derivative is zero we must have
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0, we are able to provide a simple
algebraic expression to exactly evaluate the sign of the second derivative of the payoff
function at a point at which the first derivative is zero.
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Define the function sign : R → {−1, 0, 1} by sign(x) = −1 if x < 0, sign(x) = 0 if


















Evidently, αi ≤ 1/2 implies that 1−2αi(1−τi) > 0 and so we have a simple but strong
sufficient condition under which the second derivative of the payoff function is negative.
But we are able to do better: the expression in Lemma 3 has a monotonicity property
because of which the sign of the expression is negative if and only if the tariff rate chosen
is to the right of a threshold value.15 So if the first derivative were to be zero at a point
to the left of the threshold value then the second derivative at that point would have
to be positive; but then, by using the boundary condition result in Lemma 2 (i), the
continuity of the first derivative, and the Intermediate Value Theorem, there would have
to exist another point further to the left at which the first derivative would again be zero
but where, by continuity, the second derivative would necessarily be negative. Since this
happens at a point to the left of the threshold value it produces a contradiction.
Lemma 4 shows two properties that summarize the discussion: that, at a point at which
the first derivative of the payoff function is zero, the second derivative of the function







6= 0, so any solution to the first order condition is
robust (which is a much stronger result than claiming that robust intersection is a generic
property in some appropriate space of parameters); and if either αi ≤ 1/2 or the result
in Lemma 2 (i) holds, then at such a point the second derivative of the payoff function








This suffices to show that there is a unique best response and that it is continuous








6= 0. If αi ≤ 1/2 or if ωi2∑
j ωj2








3.2 PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN THE TARIFF GAME
We are now in a position to show that interior pure strategy Nash equilibria exist
in the tariff game played by countries whose fundamentals satisfy the mild conditions
specified in Theorem 1. The conditions restrict the distribution of endowments by ruling
out extreme cases in which a single country’s endowment of a good is equal to the world’s
endowment of that good. The example in Section 2.5 illustrates that the conditions cannot
be relaxed.
THEOREM 1: Assume that, for all i ∈ I, ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 and ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1. The tariff game of
15The threshold value, defined in the proof of Lemma 4, is τ̂i =
[
∑
j 6=i A(αj ,τj)ωj2][2αi−1]
2αi[ωi2+
∑
j 6=i A(αj ,τj)ωj2]
.
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such an economy has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from an intuitive result which says that when the
strategy space is an interval, and player i’s payoff function is (i) increasing in i’s choice
at the left boundary and decreasing in i’s choice at the right boundary and (ii) has a
negative second derivative at every point at which the first derivative is zero, the game
has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and the fact that by Lemma 1, 2, and
4, the tariff game satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). The intuitive existence result holds in
a more general setting with one dimensional strategy sets and is stated and proved as
Lemma S.8 in Section 7.
4. STRICTLY INCREASING BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
In this section we show that the tariff game is a game of strategic complementarity
in that best response functions are strictly increasing. We also provide three robust
examples of tariff games that fail to be supermodular. Since the tariff game is defined on
the product of intervals, and the payoff functions are twice continuously differentiable, to
ask whether it is a supermodular game is a natural line of enquiry.16 Were this to be true
then existence would follow immediately as would a number of other useful properties
including the implication that best responses are increasing functions (Results 1 and 4 in
Vives (2007)), i.e. a direct appeal to lattice theory would make redundant the detailed
development to verify quasiconcavity that culminates in the proof of Lemma 4.17
One needs to check whether ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τj
(~τ) ≥ 0 everywhere. In Lemma 5 (i) we show that,
at points at which the first derivative is zero, the sign of the cross partial derivative is
indeed positive. In Lemma 5 (ii), we provide an explicit algebraic expression for the sign
of the cross partial derivative; so a computation allows us to confirm that a specific tariff
game is not supermodular.




































−2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
]













16Vives (2007) ia a brief survey of supermodularity that suffices for the purpose at hand.
17Since the best response functions are strictly increasing, by Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon
(1994), the tariff game’s payoffs must satisfy the single crossing property. However, it is not obvious that
the payoff functions specified in Lemma 1 (a) do satisfy the required condition so such an ex post result
does not really help us.
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By Lemma 5 (i), the positive cross partial condition holds on the restricted set of
strategy profiles that are in the graph of the best response function for that player.
By Lemma 5 (ii), the sign of the cross partial derivative is positive at τi = 1, and around
that value by continuity, since the term in the third line drops out and the other two
terms are positive. This suggests that it might be possible to identify sets of endowments
that together with the bounds specified in Lemma 2 induce strategy sets that are in the
neighbourhood of one so that the cross partial derivative is positive.
THEOREM 2: Assume that ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 and ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1. The best response function of
player i is well-defined, differentiable, and strictly increasing in τj for all j 6= i.
Theorem 2 may be proved as follows. By continuity of the payoff function and com-
pactness of the strategy set, the best response is well defined. Under the conditions
provided, one can combine Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 (i) and the implicit function theorem
to conclude that each best response function is differentiable and strictly increasing in
every other player’s choice. We omit a full formal proof.
We turn to a brief presentation of three examples in each of which the tariff game fails
to be supermodular and this failure is robust; the details can be found in the Appendix
where, for each example, we also check whether the proposed tariff rates satisfy bounds
discussed in Section 2.3.
In the first example there are two countries with identical symmetric preferences. Even
in this rudimentary environment supermodularity fails at (τ1, τ2) = (3, 1/2).
EXAMPLE 1: Let there be two countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 8/67
α2 = 1/2 ω21 = 4 ω22 = 2.
In the next example we allow one out of many countries to have a different preference
parameter and show that the violation can occur with τ1 = 11/10 and τi = 1, i 6= 1, when
we have a few more than six hundred countries.
EXAMPLE 2: Let there be I countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/3 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 80/22
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = 2 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2, · · · , I.
The last example combines the features of the first two examples: it considers many
countries with identical symmetric preferences and generates a violation of supermodular-
ity close to free trade by introducing appropriate heterogeneity of endowments, specifically
τ1 = 11/10 and τi = 1, i 6= 1, and we have a few more than two hundred countries.
EXAMPLE 3: Let there be I countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 10/11
13
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = 4 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2, · · · , I.
The specifications in the three examples vary quite a bit and suggest that, when
there are many countries, for supermodularity to fail to obtain at tariff rates that satisfy
reasonable bounds, we need some country to be quite different.
5. ON NASH EQUILIBRIA OF THE TARIFF GAME
In this section we highlight properties of Nash equilibria in our tariff game when





< 1. By Theorem 2, the tariff game is one of strategic complementarity.
Lemma 6 allows us to conclude that the sufficient condition identified in the literature
that allows payoff comparisons across Nash equilibria must be violated in our model. Even
so, in Proposition 2 we are able to show that country i’s payoff is monotone increasing
as we move away from the value one along i’s best response function. More surprisingly,
Proposition 3 allows us to determine the direction of negotiated tariff changes that induce
a Pareto improvement relative to a Nash equilibrium and shows that it suffices that at
most two countries participate in the negotiations. We also provide results on the location
of the best response function, on lower bounds of the arithmetic and harmonic means of
equilibrium tariff rates, with the further implication that there is at most one symmetric
equilibrium, and, finally, that a Nash equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal if and only
if there is no trade. We then comment on the extent to which comparative statics exercises
can be carried out, and we briefly touch upon the issue of uniqueness.
Our first result provides information on the location of the best response function.
PROPOSITION 1: Let ~τ be such that τj = 1 for all j 6= i and ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0. Then τi > 1
if and only if i is an exporter of good 1 when trade is free.
The result adds to what we know about each best response function—that, by Theorem
2, they are strictly increasing and that, by Lemma 2, they take interior values at boundary
points. The upper and lower bounds on strategy sets identified in Section 2.3 provide
further restrictions, where we recall that the bounds are likely to be fairly tight in cases
where the number of countries is large, and that the bounds become even tighter when
the distribution of endowments is more symmetric.
The next lemma provides the tool that we need for the two propositions on payoff
comparisons that follow. It shows that, at a point on the graph of the best response,
the direction in which country i’s payoff moves in response to changes in tariffs set by
other countries is determined only by the value of its own tariff relative to free trade.
It is immediate that in our model, ∂vi
∂τj
(~τ) cannot be of uniform sign; it follows that the
standard route in the literature to making Pareto comparisons across Nash equilibria,
which requires that ∂vi
∂τj
(~τ) is of uniform sign, a strong condition which is not implied by
supermodularity, is not available to us.
14
LEMMA 6: Let ~τ such that ∂vi
∂τi





= sign {τi − 1} .
Lemma 6 suffices to show that as we move along country i’s best response, points that
are further from τi = 1 in either direction result in higher payoffs to country i.




(~τ ′) = 0.
If either τi > τ
′
i ≥ 1 or τi < τ ′i ≤ 1 then vi(~τ) > vi(~τ ′).
As we have already noted, we cannot invoke the standard route to making payoff
comparisons. Yet, by Proposition 2 monotonicity results hold on either side of the value
τi = 1 allowing us to compare payoffs across some pairs of equilibrium strategy profiles
for some players, and this despite the fact that our tariff game is induced by an economy
in general equilibrium. This is possible because all Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of
the tariff game can be ordered as best response functions are strictly increasing.
We turn to the determination of the nature and direction of negotiated tariff changes
that induce Pareto improving allocations relative to a Nash equilibrium. As we shall
shortly confirm in Proposition 5, in the generic case the allocation induced at a Nash
equilibrium fails to be Pareto optimal and it follows that there will be strategy profiles at
which payoffs are higher; however, since the payoff functions are quasiconcave only in the
country’s own choice, it is not obvious that more specific recommendations can be made.
Somewhat surprisingly, Lemma 6 allows us to provide a much more succint answer.
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the endowment is not a Pareto optimal allocation and
consider an interior Nash equilibrium. (i) If there are countries i, j ∈ I such that
τ ∗i > 1 > τ
∗
j then a Pareto improvement can be induced by forming two groups such that
if i and j are in the same group then either (a) τ ∗i > 1 and τ
∗
j > 1 or (b) τ
∗
i < 1 and
τ ∗j < 1, and with the same number of countries in each group, and moving the tariffs of
both sets towards the free trade value by appropriate amounts. (ii) If all countries are
on the same side of free trade then a Pareto improvement can be induced by moving the
tariff rate of any one country further away from free trade.
So, when not all countries choose equilibrium tariff rates on the same side of free trade,
the participation of just two countries suffices since the negative effects of local changes
in tariff rates can be controlled by considering a “balanced” set of countries whose rates
are adjusted, where balance simply requires that for each country with an equilibrium
tariff rate that exceeds one that has its rate adjusted there is one and only one country
with an equilibrium rate that is less than one whose rate is also adjusted. We do not
know whether the alternative case, in which all countries choose equilibrium tariff rates
on the same side of free trade, can arise, but if it does then changing the rate of a single
country, i.e. a unilateral move, suffices to induce a Pareto improvement. Also, the result
in Proposition 3 refers to local changes that induce higher payoffs.
Our next result sharply delimits the region in the strategy space where one might
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expect to find pure strategy Nash equilibria of the tariff game.










> I − 1. (ii) If at an interior Nash equilibrium of the tariff game τ ∗i = τ ∗ for
all i ∈ I, then, necessarily, τ ∗i = 1 for all i ∈ I.
By Proposition 4 (i), at any interior Nash equilibrium, for some i and i′, τ ∗i > (I−1)/I
and τ ∗i′ < I/(I − 1). By Proposition 4 (ii), only free trade can be a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, a result that we use in the proof of Proposition 5.
For our last formally stated result, it is useful to recall that, for a “generic” economy,
the endowment vector is not a Pareto optimal allocation.
PROPOSITION 5: A Nash equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if there
is no trade.
Proposition 5 shows that, for a “generic” economy, the equilibrium allocations of the
tariff game fail to be Pareto optimal and there is trade in every equilibrium.18
We turn to the possibility of obtaining comparative statics results. Since the solutions
to the I first order conditions completely characterize pure strategy Nash equilibria, such




































Lemma 4 and the implicit function theorem allow us to conclude that i raises τi in response
to an increase in ωi1 or in ωj2, and reduces τi in response to an increase in ωi2 or in ωj1. So
we can determine the shifts in the best response functions of all the countries in response to
endowment changes. For example, as ωi1 increases, τi increases and τj decreases for every
j 6= i;19 it is that very feature of the shifts being in the “same direction” that prevents
us from drawing general conclusions about changes in equilibrium behaviour in response







is difficult to determine, we
cannot make any progress on changes in choices made in response to changes to preference
parameters.
We make a brief remark on uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. The problem has quite a
lot of geometric structure and we are able to show that the matrix of second derivatives
of the payoff functions evaluated at a Nash equilibrium can be written in the form: V ·
18It is easy to check that if free trade is a Nash equilibrium then the endowment must be a Pareto
optimal allocation. It is also easy to show that only a subset of the set of Pareto optimal allocations can
be induced by appropriate choice of tariff rates.
19To fix ideas, consider the case of just two countries. Each country’s best response moves to the right,
where we assign τ1 to the horizontal axis.
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∆M + V · ∆N where the matrix V is a diagonal matrix with generic element vi(~τ) ·
∂A(αi,τi)
∂τi
> 0, ∆M is another diagonal matrix with generic element −αi − 1−αi(τi)2 < 0, and
∆N is a positive matrix with a very specific form.20 The structure of the matrix, and
the fact that the boundary behaviour of the system is nice, strongly suggest the use of
degree theoretic methods to identify conditions that are sufficient to ensure uniqueness of
equilibrium. Although we have not been able to find a useful way to work out the sign of
the determinant, numerical methods appear to be a promising route to follow.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
We have presented and analysed a model of tariff retaliation with many countries. The
principal restriction that we imposed was to assume that all preferences are in the Cobb-
Douglas class. This was for analytical tractability and yet, as we showed, the induced
tariff game fails to be supermodular. It is, however, a game in which all best response
functions are increasing and that allowed us to develop a number of interesting results.
We hope that the model or its extensions will be taken to the data. Independent of
that, one could ask whether the specification adopted helps in shedding light on models
with some aspects of cooperative behaviour like customs unions or the Most Favoured
Nation clause in trade agreements.
On the technical side there are two obvious candidates for further research. The
first involves extending the model to three or more goods, and one imagines that many
of the results in Section 5 will go through provided that the best response functions are
increasing. To show the latter one will have to grapple with quasiconcavity and the sign of
some cross partial derivatives. The model with two goods treated by us has the advantage
that the relative price in the Walrasian equilibrium has a simple analytical form which
allowed us to obtain explicit expressions for the payoff functions and, with some algebraic
manipulations, we were able to identify the signs of various first and second order, own
and cross, partial derivatives. With more than one relative price, such explicit forms are
the solution of a large linear system of equations; as a result, the expressions for the payoff
functions are not amenable to manipulations making the identification of the signs of the
various derivatives an arduous task. The second candidate for further research asks the
more fundamental question about how special a sub-class Cobb-Douglas preferences form
when requiring normality of both goods and uniqueness of Walrasian equilibrium with
tariff distortions in a two good world with an arbitrary number of countries and arbitrary
nonnegative endowments.
7. PROOFS
The proofs of Lemma 1-6 use a number of supplementary results which are stated here;
the proofs of the statements are either in this section or in the Supplementary Material
(appended to the manuscript for the referee’s benefit).
20Lemma S.4 and S.5 in Section 7 provide the details of the elements of ∆N .
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In what follows, we will find it easier to work with the reciprocal of the price p∗2(~τ).






Lemma S.1 is our first supplementary result; it provides the evaluation of three partial
derivatives that will be used later.





















{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} .
We can now proceed to prove Lemma 1.






















j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1











which, upon using xi2 =
(1−αi)τi1p1
αiτi2p2





































− 1 and obtain




























(ii) Recall that f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
so that (i) may be rewritten as
















(αi, τi)(1− A(αi, τi))1−αi
+(A(αi, τi))






















We group some terms from the first two lines in the expression above to obtain the first
two lines below; we also substitute for ∂f
∂τi
(~τ) from Lemma S.1 and collect some common








· [αi (1− A(αi, τi))− (1− αi)A(αi, τi)]
A(αi, τi)[1− A(αi, τi)]
∂A
∂τi











{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} ·
{
(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
}
.









αi − A(αi, τi)
A(αi, τi)[1− A(αi, τi)]
+

















where we use the fact that







(αi − 1)αiτi + αi(1− αi)
(1− αi)
= αi(1− τi)
and we incorporate the explicit form of the function f(~τ).

















PROOF: Since A(αi, τi) ∈ (0, 1) and ωi ∈ R2+/{0}, from Lemma 1 (i) we have vi(~τ) > 0.
Also, by Lemma S.1, ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) > 0. The result follows directly from Lemma 1 (ii).
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− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
.









We turn to the proof of Lemma 2 which establishes conditions under which there is
an interior solution to the first order condition ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0.
LEMMA 2: (i) If ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I then there exists τ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all
τ ∈ (0, τ ], for all i ∈ I, ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) > 0 for τ−i ∈ [τ ,∞)I−1; (ii) if ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I
then there exists τ > 1 such that, for all τ ∈ [τ ,∞), for all i ∈ I, ∂vi
∂τi
(τ , τ−i) < 0 for
τ−i ∈ (0, τ ]I−1.
PROOF: By Lemma S.2, the sign of ∂vi
∂τi




(1− αi) · ωi1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
.
In (i) below, we ignore the positive second term and show that even so the sum of the
remaining terms is positive for some τ sufficiently small. In (ii) we ignore the last term,
which is negative, and show that for some τ sufficiently large the sum of the remaining
terms is, nonetheless, negative.
Let α := mini∈I αi and α := maxi∈I αi; evidently, 0 < α ≤ α < 1.
(i) By hypothesis ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1 for all i ∈ I; so there must exist τ ∈ (0, 1) such that
∀ i ∈ I τ [τ + (1− α)/α]







⇔ ∀ i ∈ I τ · A(α, τ) ·
∑
j




By Lemma S.1, A(αj, τj) is increasing in αj, and so
















By Lemma S.1 A(αj, τj) is increasing in τj, and so, for τj ≥ τ , we must have




⇔ ∀ i ∈ I A(αi, τ)ωi2 < (1− τ)
[∑
j 6=i
A(αj, τj)ωj2 + A(αi, τ)ωi2
]
⇔ ∀ i ∈ I ωi2∑




⇔ ∀ i ∈ I 0 < αi(1− τ)
A(αi, τ)
− αi · ωi2∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 + A(αi, τ)ωi2
.
That verifies the sign of the expression.
The proof is completed by observing that the same argument holds for all τ ∈ (0, τ ].
(ii) By hypothesis ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 for all i ∈ I; so there must exist τ , with 1/τ ∈ (0, 1),
such that
∀ i ∈ I 1
τ
[1/τ + α/(1− α)]









⇔ ∀ i ∈ I [1− A(α, τ)] ·
∑
j




By Lemma S.1 A(αj, τj) is increasing in α, and so
⇒ ∀ i ∈ I [1− A(αi, τ)]ωi1 +
∑
j 6=i














Since [1− A(αi, τi)] = 1−αiαiτi A(αi, τi), we have
⇔ ∀ i ∈ I 1− αi
αi






By Lemma S.1 A(αj, τj) is increasing in τj, and so, for τj ≤ τ , we must have
⇔ ∀ i ∈ I (1− αi)
αi
·A(αi, τ)·ωi1 < (τ−1)
[∑
j 6=i
[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 + [1− A(αi, τ)]ωi1
]
⇔ ∀ i ∈ I (1− αi) · ωi1∑





⇔ ∀ i ∈ I αi(1− τ)
A(αi, τ)
+
(1− αi) · ωi1∑
j 6=i[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 + [1− A(αi, τ)]ωi1
< 0.
That verifies the sign of the expression.
The proof is completed by observing that the same argument holds for all τ ∈ [τ ,∞).
The next supplementary result, Lemma S.4, provides an evaluation of ∂Ni
∂τj
(~τ). It is











(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
}
.
We now state a supplementary result that prepares the groundwork for the proof of
Lemma 3 where we pin down the sign of ∂
2vi
∂τi ∂τi
(~τ) at ~τ at which ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0.
LEMMA S.5: If ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 and
∂vj
∂τj

















































Our penultimate supplementary result is used in Lemma 3 and 4.
LEMMA S.6: If ~τ is such that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 then
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0.
PROOF: Since A(αj, τj) > 0, ωj2 ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈I ωi2 > 0, we have (i)
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 ≥ 0
and (ii)
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 = 0 if and only if ωj2 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi2 > 0.





























= αiτi + (1− αi) = (1− αi)/ (1−αi)αiτi+(1−αi) =
1−αi


















unless ωj1 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi1 > 0 in which case the expression takes the value zero.
So if ωj2 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi2 > 0 and ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0 then, necessarily,
ωj1 = 0 for all j 6= i and ωi1 > 0. But that contradicts our assumption that for every i ∈ I,
ωi ∈ R2+/{0}. We conclude that if ~τ is such that ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0 then
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0.







































































From Lemma S.2, ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 if and only if M(αi, τi) + Ni(~τ) = 0. In addition, as noted
in the proof of Lemma S.2, vi(~τ) > 0 and
∂A
∂τi






































































= −1− 2αi + 2αiτi
(τi)2
























] − 2ωi2αi(1− τi)
A(αi, τi)




























which, upon introducing the notation A−i :=
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2, recalling that A(αi, τi) =
αiτi
αiτi+(1−αi) , and simplifying, can be expressed as
= (ωi2)
2 [A(αi, τi)]
2 − 2ωi2αi(1− τi)A(αi, τi) [A−i + A(αi, τi)ωi2]
− [A−i + A(αi, τi)ωi2]2 [1− 2αi(1− τi)] ,
which, by expanding the terms within brackets and collecting terms, may be expressed as
= − [1− 2αi(1− τi)] [A(αi, τi)ωi2]2+(ωi2)2 [A(αi, τi)]2−2ωi2αi(1−τi)A(αi, τi) [A(αi, τi)ωi2]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] [2A−i · A(αi, τi)ωi2]− 2ωi2αi(1− τi)A(αi, τi) [A−i]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] (A−i)2 ,
= [A(αi, τi)]
2 {− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] + 1− 2αi(1− τi)} (ωi2)2
−2A(αi, τi) {[1− 2αi(1− τi)] + (1− τi)αi} [A−iωi2]
− [1− 2αi(1− τi)] (A−i)2 .
Evidently, the coefficients in the first term on the right add up to zero and the second






= −2A(αi, τi) [1− αi(1− τi)] [A−iωi2]−[1− 2αi(1− τi)] (A−i)2 ,
which, upon recalling that A(αi, τi) =
αiτi
αiτi+(1−αi) , may be simplified to
= −A−i {2αiτiωi2 + [1− 2αi(1− τi)]A−i} .
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j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2 > 0, i.e. A−i > 0, and so, at

















where we replace A−i by
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2.








LEMMA S.7: The two equations that follow cannot hold simultaneously:










j [1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0.
PROOF: Set A−i :=
∑
j 6=iA(αj, τj)ωj2, and rewrite the first equation as





















+ αi(1− τi)ωi2 − αiωi2,
























− αiωi2 ≥ 0 with a strict inequality if ωi2 > 0.


























6= 0. If αi ≤ 1/2 or if ωi2∑
j ωj2
















If αi ≤ 1/2 then 0 < 1 − 2αi(1 − τi) for all τi > 0, and the required result follows
directly from Lemma 3.












which is well defined since
∑

































1 if τi ∈ (0, τ̂i)
0 if τi = τ̂i
−1 if τi ∈ (τ̂i,+∞) .
We specialize the notation for the remainder of the proof of Lemma 4: ~τ refers to a
profile at which ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0, and ~τ i denotes the i-th component of the vector ~τ .
If ~τ i > τ̂i then the sign of the expression in curly brackets evaluated at ~τ
i is negative,















6= 0, ~τ i = τ̂i is ruled out.
The case that remains is where ~τ i < τ̂i. We shall show that this case leads to a
contradiction and so cannot arise. For ~τ i < τ̂i the sign of the expression in curly








τ = min {τ ,minj∈I ~τ j}, where τ is as specified in Lemma 2 (i). Evidently, τ ∈ (0, ~τ i].
Since ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1, By Lemma 2 (i), ∂vi
∂τi








> 0, and the function ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) is continuous, by the Intermediate








< 0. But then, by Lemma 3, the sign of the expression in curly
brackets evaluated at τ̃ is negative even though τ̃ < τ̂i, which delivers the desired contra-
diction.
THEOREM 1: Assume that, for all i ∈ I, ωi1∑
j ωj1
< 1 and ωi2∑
j ωj2
< 1. The tariff game of
such an economy has an interior pure strategy Nash equlibrium.
PROOF: The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1-4 and Lemma S.8 below: The
latter shows that when the strategy space is an interval, and player i’s payoff function
is (i) increasing in i’s choice at the left boundary and decreasing in i’s choice at the
right boundary and (ii) has a negative second derivative at every point at which the first
derivative is zero, the game has an interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium;21 Lemma 1-4
ensure that the tariff game satisfies the conditions specified in Lemma S.8.
Consider the following game. The set of players is I = {1, 2, · · · , I} with generic
element i. S is the strategy set of each player. The choice made by player i is denoted
si. Payoffs are given by the functions πi : S
I → R. Let s−i := ((sj)j 6=i) denote a profile of
actions for all but agent i, and write payoffs as πi(si, s−i). We have
LEMMA S.8: Assume that S := [s, s] ⊂ R, and that, for every i ∈ I, the function πi
is twice continuously differentiable on (t, t)I where [s, s] ⊂ (t, t). Suppose that for each
i ∈ I and every profile s−i the following conditions hold:
(i) ∂πi
∂si
(s, s−i) > 0 and
∂πi
∂si
(s, s−i) < 0,
(ii) if s̃i is such that
∂πi
∂si









Then there exists (s∗1, · · · , s∗I) ∈ SI , with s∗i ∈ (s, s) for each i ∈ I, such that
for each i ∈ I si ∈ S ⇒ πi(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ πi(si, s∗−i).22
PROOF: Fix a profile s−i and consider the problem of identifying ŝi := argmaxsi∈S πi(si, s−i).
Since S is a compact set and πi is a continuous function of si, such a value ŝi must exist.
Note that ∂πi
∂si
(si, s−i) is a continuously differentiable function of si. Since S = [s, s],
by condition (i), continuity, and the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a value s̃i ∈
(s, s) at which ∂πi
∂si
(s̃i, s−i) = 0, i.e. the function has a zero in the interior of the set








< 0, the sufficient condition for s̃i to be a local
maximum is met.
By condition (i), ŝi /∈ {s, s}, i.e. the solution to the maximization problem cannot be
at either boundary point. But then ŝi = s̃i since the necessary condition for an interior
point to be a maximizer is satisfied only at s̃i.
We have shown that given a profile s−i, i’s best response always exists, is an interior
point, and is a single value. But then, as we now show, the function πi must be quasi-
21We state and prove the result since we were unable to find a suitable reference.
22Furthermore, since S is compact and πi is continuous, all Nash equilibria are interior, s
∗
i ∈ (s, s).
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concave in si. If not then for some profile s−i and some p, the upper set is not convex,
i.e. there are values s1i , s
2
i , and s
3








i , s−i) ≥ p,
πi(s
3
i , s−i) ≥ p but πi(s2i , s−i) < p. Since πi is continuously differentiable, there would
exist s4i ∈ (s1i , s3i ) such that ∂πi∂si (s
4








> 0, where the latter
follows from the fact that πi(s
1
i , s−i) ≥ p, πi(s3i , s−i) ≥ p but πi(s2i , s−i) < p. But that
contradicts condition (ii) in the statement of the proposition.
Since the set S is compact and convex, and for each i the payoff function is quasicon-
cave in si for a given profile s−i, the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium follows
(see, e.g., Theorem 3 in Debreu (1982)). Interiority has already been established and is
maintained since S is compact and πi is continuous and when taken together they ensure
that πi is uniformly continuous.




































−2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
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= 0 and ∂M
∂τj
(αi, τi) = 0 follow easily from Lemma S.1 (i)















for i 6= j.
We know from Lemma S.1 that ∂A
∂τi


















(i) From Lemma S.2, ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 if and only if M(αi, τi) +Ni(~τ) = 0. In addition, as



















> 0 for i 6= j,
since the sign of that last expression can be determined by using Lemma S.4.
(ii) Recall that f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
and rewrite Lemma 1 (i) as







































where we substitute for ∂f
∂τj
(~τ) from Lemma S.1.
We can now evaluate
∂vi(~τ)
∂τj
· [M(αi, τi) +Ni(~τ)] + vi(~τ) ·
∂Ni
∂τj









(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
}
















(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
}
,
where we use Lemma S.4 to evaluate ∂Ni
∂τj





(αj, τj), and collect terms and simplify to obtain
= (A(αi, τi))









(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
]















(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
]}
.








= sign {Lij} . (∗∗)
From the definitions of the terms M(αi, τi) and Ni(~τ) we see that













+(1− αi)ωi1 − αi · ωi2 · (f(~τ))−1.
Using the last expression, we may rewrite
Lij =
[
(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
]










+ (1− αi)ωi1 − αi · ωi2 · (f(~τ))−1
}









(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
]
.
Upon recognizing the expression for (f(~τ))−2 in explicit form, we obtain
Lij =
[
(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
]2 · [f(~τ)ωj1 + ωj2]
+ [ωi1f(~τ) + ωi2] · (f(~τ))−2 ·
[




(1− αi)ωi1 + (−αi)(f(~τ))−1ωi2
]









Recalling (∗∗) and that f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
, we obtain the desired result.
PROPOSITION 1: Let ~τ be such that τj = 1 for all j 6= i and ∂vi∂τi (~τ) = 0. Then τi > 1
if and only if i is an exporter of good 1 when trade is free.
PROOF: Since consumption of good 1 in country i at equilibrium prices is
xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) = A(αi, τi)[ωi1 + p
∗
2 (~τ)ωi2],
we have that, in the absence of tariffs, i.e. at the strategy profile ~τ = (1, · · · , 1),
xi1 (p
∗
2 (1, · · · , 1)) = αi · [ωi1 + p∗2 (1, · · · , 1)ωi2].





























{ωi1 − xi1 (p∗2 (1, · · · , 1))}
}
,
where, under Assumption 1,
∑
j[1−A(αj, τj)]ωj1 > 0. We have shown that i is an exporter
of good 1 when trade is free if and only if ∂vi
∂τi
(1, · · · , 1) > 0. Since the maximizer is unique,
we must have τi > 1 as claimed.
LEMMA 6: Let ~τ such that ∂vi
∂τi





= sign {τi − 1} .
PROOF: Since ∂vi
∂τi

























⇔ ωi1 > αi·[ωi1+p∗2 (~τ)ωi2].
From the proof of Lemma 5—please refer to the beginning of the proof of (ii)—we know














where f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
. It follows that
∂vi(~τ)
∂τj
> 0 ⇔ ωi1 > αi · [ωi1 + p∗2 (~τ)ωi2] ⇔ τi > 1.




(~τ ′) = 0.
If either τi > τ
′
i ≥ 1 or τi < τ ′i ≤ 1 then vi(~τ) > vi(~τ ′).
PROOF: From Lemma 6 we have
∂vi(~τ)
∂τj
> 0 ⇔ τi > 1.
Since the best response function is strictly increasing we can conclude that, under the
conditions stated, vi increases as we move further away from τi = 1.
PROPOSITION 3: Assume that the endowment is not a Pareto optimal allocation and
consider an interior Nash equilibrium. (i) If there are countries i, j ∈ I such that
31
τ ∗i > 1 > τ
∗
j then a Pareto improvement can be induced by forming two groups such that
if i and j are in the same group then either (a) τ ∗i > 1 and τ
∗
j > 1 or (b) τ
∗
i < 1 and
τ ∗j < 1, and with the same number of countries in each group, and moving the tariffs of
both sets towards the free trade value by appropriate amounts. (ii) If all countries are
on the same side of free trade then a Pareto improvement can be induced by moving the
tariff rate of any one country further away from free trade.
PROOF: Let ~τ be an interior Nash equilibrium profile of tariff rates so that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0













(αj, τj) {f(~τ)ωj1 + ωj2} ,
where f(~τ) = 1
p∗2(~τ)
. From the proof of Lemma 6 we know that, for i 6= j, ∂vi(~τ)
∂τj
=
αi(~τ) · βj(~τ), that αi(~τ) > 0 if and only if τi > 1, and that βj(~τ) > 0.
Define I+ := {i ∈ I : αi(~τ) > 0} and I− := {i ∈ I : αi(~τ) < 0}.






if i ∈ Î+
1
βi(~τ)
if i ∈ Î−
0 if i /∈ Î+ ∪ Î−.


















where we use the fact that ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 and that ∂vi(~τ)
∂τj
= αi(~τ) · βj(~τ). Substituting the







































if i /∈ Î+ ∪ Î−.
Since #Î+ = #Î− > 0, we have
∆vi =

αi(~τ) · [1] if i ∈ Î+
αi(~τ) · [−1] if i ∈ Î−
0 if i /∈ Î+ ∪ Î−,
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and it follows that ∆vi > 0 if i ∈ Î+ ∪ Î− and that ∆vi = 0 otherwise.
If I+ = ∅ then a Pareto improvement can be induced by setting ∆τi < 0 for a single
country (and zero otherwise); similarly, if I− = ∅ then set ∆τi > 0 for some country and
zero for the rest. This works because the incentives of all the countries are aligned.
The case in which I+ = I− = ∅ can be ruled out since then the Nash equilbrium
induces the free trade allocation which, by Proposition 5, requires that the endowment
vector be a Pareto optimal allocation.










> I − 1. (ii) If at an interior Nash equilibrium of the tariff game τ ∗i = τ ∗ for
all i ∈ I, then, necessarily, τ ∗i = 1 for all i ∈ I.
PROOF: Let ~τ be an interior Nash equilibrium profile of tariff rates. It follows ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0






− αi · ωi2∑
j A(αj, τj)ωj2
= 0.











































j τj[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1
< 0.
It follows that in any interior Nash equilibrium,
∑





> I − 1.














− I + 1 = 1
τ
.
Since I > 1, it is evident that τ = 1, i.e τi = 1 for all i ∈ I.
PROPOSITION 5: A Nash equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if there
is no trade.
PROOF: Let ~τ be a Nash equilibrium profile of tariff rates. Since all Nash equilibrium
profiles are interior, it follows ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 for each i ∈ I. We write τi instead of τ ∗i . By




















since, under Assumption 1,
∑
j[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 > 0.




must hold at (xi1, xi2) = (xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) , xi2 (p
∗
2 (~τ))); the condition may also be written in
the form τi · p∗2(~τ) =
(1−αi)/xi2
αi/xi1
where (xi1, xi2) = (xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) , xi2 (p
∗
2 (~τ))).
(i) In order for the allocation at the Nash equilibrium to be Pareto optimal, marginal
rates of substitution have to be equalized and so, for each pair of agents i and j, we must
have
(1− αi)/xi2 (p∗2 (~τ))
αi/xi1 (p∗2 (~τ))
=
(1− αj)/xj2 (p∗2 (~τ))
αj/xj1 (p∗2 (~τ))
⇐⇒ τi · p∗2(~τ) = τj · p∗2(~τ)
and we must have τi = τ for all i ∈ I. But then, from Proposition 4 (ii), τi = τ = 1 so
that, at the Nash equilibrium, trade is free.
When we use τi = 1 for all i ∈ I in (∗), and recall the explicit form for p∗2 (~τ), we see
that, for each i ∈ I, we must have
(1− αi)ωi1 − αi · ωi2 · p∗2(1, · · · , 1) = 0.
But that is identical to i’s first order condition in the domestic market for the two goods,
1 · p∗2(1 · · · , 1) =
(1−αi)/xi2
αi/xi1
, when (xi1, xi2) = ωi.
We have shown that, at a Nash equilibrium at which the allocation is Pareto optimal,
there is no trade. That completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Suppose that the Nash equilibrium has the additional property that there is no
trade. It follows that at p∗2(~τ), (xi1 (p
∗
2 (~τ)) , xi2 (p
∗
2 (~τ))) = ωi for all i ∈ I. So i’s first




at (xi1, xi2) = ωi. Since p
∗
2(~τ) ∈ (0,+∞), we can be certain that a no-trade outcome can
































(1− αi)ωi1 = 0,
which, upon recalling that A(αi, τi) =
αiτi






−[αiτi + (1− αi)]
∑
j




so that at least one of the two expressions within brackets must be zero.
It follows that if τi 6= 1 for some i ∈ I, then for all such i∑
j
[1− A(αj, τj)]ωj1 = [1− A(αi, τi)]ωi1,
where we use the fact that αiτi + (1 − αi) > 0 and the definition of A(αi, τi). We have
at least one equation. Also, 1 − A(αi, τi) > 0 and ωi ∈ R2++ since we have a no-trade







= 0 for each i ∈ I, that is ~τ = (1, · · · , 1) and, from i’s first
order condition in the domestic market for the two goods, at the interior Nash equilibrium
under consideration, marginal rates of substitution are equalized across countries. This
can happen only if the endowment distribution (which is the equilibrium allocation since
we are considering a no trade equilibrium) is also a Pareto optimal allocation.
We have shown that, at a Nash equilibrium at which there is no trade, the allocation
is Pareto optimal. That completes the proof of (ii).
APPENDIX
ROBUST EXAMPLES OF TARIFF GAMES THAT ARE NOT SUPERMODULAR
We turn to the details of the three examples presented in Section 4 in each of which
the tariff game fails to be supermodular and this failure is robust; further details of the
computations can be found in the Supplementary Material (appended to the manuscript
for the referee’s benefit). In each case we also check whether the proposed tariff rates
satisfy bounds discussed in Section 2.3.
EXAMPLE 1: Let there be two countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 8/67
α2 = 1/2 ω21 = 4 ω22 = 2.
At τ1 = 3 we have A(α1, τ1) = 3/4, while if τ2 = 1/2 we have A(α2, τ2) = 1/3. It
follows that p∗2(3, 1/2) =
67
16
. It is easy to evaluate the expression in Lemma 5 (ii) and













} = 1/3, and also α1 = α2,
for the bounds we may use any pair (τ , τ) such that τ < 8
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, and τ1 = 3 and τ2 = 1/2, we clearly have τ < τ2 and τ1 < τ so that the tariff
rates considered in the example are in the strategy sets induced by uniform bounds.
EXAMPLE 2: Let there be I countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/3 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 80/22
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = 2 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2, · · · , I.
At τ1 = 11/10 we have A(α1, τ1) = 11/31, while if τi = 1, i 6= 1, we have A(αi, τi) =
1/2. It follows that p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) = 1. Again, it is easy to evaluate the expression
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in Lemma 5 (ii) and check that it is negative if 21 · 60 < (I − 1) · 2 (please refer to the
Supplementary Material)—so we would require a few more than six hundred countries.
Turning to the bounds, since τi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ I, we need only concern ourselves with
the upper bound. We consider two different candidates, each in turn. (Where relevant,
the details of the computations can be found in the Supplementary Material.)
Observe that α = 1/3 and α = 1/2. So at τ = 11/10,
1
τ
[1/τ + α/(1− α)]
[1/τ + α/(1− α)]
= (10/11) · (42/31) > 1.






. It follows that in order for τ to
be such that the inequality
1
τ
[1/τ + α/(1− α)]





holds, it is necessary that τ > 11/10; in that case, from Section 2.3, such a value τ can
serve as a uniform upper bound. Therefore, τ1 = 11/10 will be within the strategy set
specified by any uniform upper bound.
We turn to bounds that are tighter than the uniform bounds. One easily checks that





j 6=i [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1∑
j [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1
.





j 6=i [1− A(αj, τ)]ωj1∑
j [1− A(αj, τ)]ωj1
.
Therefore, τ1 = 11/10 is not in the strategy set induced by such an upper bound.
The wide discrepancy in the two bounds is easily explained by the fact that only one
out of a large number of countries has 1/3 as its preference parameter. The violation of
the second, more informative or tighter, upper bound is an artifact of the symmetry in
endowments which we imposed to ease the computational pain. It may be rectified by
specifying the endowment of the first good in a different way. Here is a specific example:
let
I = 650
ωi1 = 2 ωi2 = 80/22 for i = 1,
ωi1 = 2 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2,
ωi1 = ω̄1 ωi2 = 2 for i = 3, 4, · · · , 649,
ωi1 = 150 ωi2 = 2 for i = 650,
where ω̄1 (approximately 1.8) satisfies the equation
1 + (1/2) · 647 · ω̄1 + (1/2) · 150 = (1/2) · 649 · 2.
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Such a specification maintains p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) = 1 and does not interfere with any
other element of the computation, i.e. it delivers a robust example of a tariff game that
fails to be supermodular. In addition, one easily checks that
mini∈I
∑
j 6=i [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1∑





From the earlier discussion we may conclude that, with the modified specification of the
example, any tighter upper bound τ must be larger than 11/10 so that now τ1 = 11/10
is in the strategy set induced by any such upper bound. That completes the desired
verification and the discussion of the example.
EXAMPLE 3: Let there be I countries with the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 10/11
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = 4 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2, · · · , I.
At τ1 = 11/10 we have A(α1, τ1) = 11/21, while if τi = 1, i 6= 1, we have A(αi, τi) =
1/2. In this case p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) = 2. Again, it is easy to evaluate the expression in
Lemma 5 (ii) and check that it is negative if I exceeds two hundred and eleven. Since
countries have identical preferences, the two approaches to the upper bound give the same
result and the bound is violated. As in Example 2, the endowments can be altered to
generate bounds that are satisfied.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL





















{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} .








αiτi + (1− αi)
]
=
αi[αiτi + (1− αi)]− αiτiαi
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2
=
αi(1− αi)









αiτi + (1− αi)
]
=
τi[αiτi + (1− αi)]− αiτi(τi − 1)
[αiτi + (1− αi)]2
=
τi


















































{f(~τ)ωi1 + ωi2} .
LEMMA S.3: ∂M
∂τi








αi(1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
αiτi
=














τi {−[αiτi + (1− αi)] + (1− τi)αi} − (1− τi)[αiτi + (1− αi)]
(τi)2
=



































































(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
}
,
where we use the expression for ∂A
∂τi
(αi, τi) obtained in Lemma S.1 and the explicit form
of the function f(~τ).
LEMMA S.5: If ∂vi
∂τi
(~τ) = 0 and
∂vj
∂τj





























PROOF: From Lemma S.2 we know that
∂vi
∂τi




k [1− A(αk, τk)]ωk1
− αi · ωi2∑
k A(αk, τk)ωk2
= 0.
Move the first term in the latter expression to the right, multiply each term by [
∑
k A(αk, τk)ωk2],
then use the definition of the function f(~τ) and rearrange the expression to obtain








Consider the expression in (∗) above for i and j and multiply the terms on the left
hand side of (∗), and the terms on the right, respectively, to obtain
(1−αi)·(1−αj)·(f(~τ))2·ωi1·ωj1+αi·αj·ωi2·ωj2−f(~τ) [(1− αi)αj · ωi1 · ωj2 + (1− αj)αi · ωj1 · ωi2]
=
[
αi · αj · (1− τi)(1− τj)






For i, multiply each term in (∗) by αj · ωj2, and for j by αi · ωi2, and add to obtain




αi · αj · ωj2(1− τi)
A(αi, τi)
+







By adding (∗∗) and (∗ ∗ ∗) and rearranging we obtain
(1−αi)·(1−αj)·(f(~τ))2·ωi1·ωj1 = αi·αj·ωi2·ωj2+
[
αi · αj · (1− τi)(1− τj)







αi · αj · ωj2(1− τi)
A(αi, τi)
+






. (∗ ∗ ∗∗)











(1− αi) (f(~τ))2 · ωj1ωi1 + αi · ωi2 · ωj2
}
.











αi · αj · ωi2 · ωj2
1− αj





αi · αj · (1− τi)(1− τj)








αi · αj · ωj2(1− τi)
A(αi, τi)
+
















 1αj · ωi2 · ωj2 +
[
(1− τi)(1− τj)



































































DETAILS OF CALCULATIONS FOR EXAMPLES 1, 2, AND 3
EXAMPLE 1: Consider the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 8/67
α2 = 1/2 ω21 = 4 ω22 = 2.









(1/4) · 2 + (2/3) · 4











We are now in a position to evaluate the expression in Lemma 5 (ii) for the specific
parameter values and at (τ1, τ2) = (3, 1/2). We find
[(1/2) · 2− (1/2) · (67/16) · (8/67)]2 · [(16/67) · 4 + 2]
+ [2 · (16/67) + (8/67)] · (16/67)−2 ·
[
(1/2) · (16/67)2 · 4 · 2 + (1/2) · (8/67) · 2
]
+ [(1/2) · 2− (1/2) · (67/16) · (8/67)] · [(16/67) · 4 + 2] · (1/2)(1− 3)
3/4
· [(1/4) · 2 + (2/3) · 4]
= [3/4]2 · [198/67] + [40/67] · [4 + (67/32)] + [3/4] · [198/67] · −4
3
· [19/6]
= (1/67) · [(9/16) · 198 + (5/4) · 195− 33 · 19] < (1/67) · [198 + 250− 33 · 15] < 0.
EXAMPLE 2: Consider the following parameter specification (we write ω̃ instead of the
value 2)
α1 = 1/3 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 80/22
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = ωi2 = ω̃ for i = 2, · · · , I.









p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) =
(20/31) · 2 + (1/2) · (I − 1) · ω̃
(11/31) · (80/22) + (1/2) · (I − 1) · ω̃
=
80/31 + (I − 1) · ω̃
80/31 + (I − 1) · ω̃
= 1.
We are now in a position to evaluate the expression in Lemma 3 (ii) for the specific
parameter values and at (~τ) = (11/10, 1, · · · , 1). We find
[(2/3) · 2− (1/3) · 1 · (80/22)]2 · [1 · ω̃ + ω̃]
4
+ [2 · 1 + (80/22)] · (1)2 ·
[
(2/3) · (1)−2 · ω̃ · 2 + (1/3) · (80/22) · ω̃
]
+ [(2/3) · 2− (1/3) · (1) · (80/22)]·[(1) · ω̃ + ω̃]·(1/3)(1− 11/10)
11/31
·[(20/31) · 2 + (1/2) · (I − 1) · ω̃]
= [8/66]2 ·2 · ω̃+(124/22) · ω̃ · [168/66]+(8/66) ·2 · ω̃ · −31
330





(8/66) + 62 · (21/22)− 31
330
· [(20/31) · 2 + (1/2) · (I − 1) · ω̃]
}
which is negative if 21 · 60 < (I − 1) · ω̃ so with ω̃ = 2 we would require a few more than
six hundred countries.
For the computation of the first bound, one easily checks that with ωi1 = 2 and
τi = 11/10 for all i ∈ I,
mini∈I
∑
j 6=i [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1∑




























if I ≤ 14.





j 6=i [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1∑
j [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1
.
For the computation of the second bound, we check that
1
11/10
[1/(11/10) + α/(1− α)]

















We calculate p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) for the revised specification of endowments with I =
650, where we recall that 1 + (1/2) · 647 · ω̄1 + (1/2) · 150 = (1/2) · 649 · 2:
p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) =
(20/31) · 2 + (1/2) · 2 + (1/2) · (I − 3) · ω̄1 + (1/2) · 150
(11/31) · (80/22) + (1/2) · (I − 1) · 2
=
(20/31) · 2 + (1/2) · 649 · 2
(11/31) · (80/22) + (1/2) · 649 · 2
=
80/31 + 649 · 2
80/31 + 649 · 2
= 1.
For the computation of the bound we check that
mini∈I
∑
j 6=i [1− A(αj, 11/10)]ωj1∑



























where we use the equation that specifies ω̄1.
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EXAMPLE 3: Consider the following parameter specification
α1 = 1/2 ω11 = 2 ω12 = 10/11
αi = 1/2 ωi1 = 4 ωi2 = 2 for i = 2, · · · , I.









p∗2(11/10, 1, · · · , 1) =
(10/21) · 2 + (1/2) · (I − 1) · 4
(11/21) · (10/11) + (1/2) · (I − 1) · 2
= 2.
We are now in a position to evaluate the expression in Lemma 3 (ii) for the specific
parameter values and at (~τ) = (11/10, 1, · · · , 1). We find
[(1/2) · 2− (1/2) · 2 · (10/11)]2 · [(1/2) · (4) + 2]
+ [2 · (1/2) + 10/11] · (2)2 ·
[
(1/2) · (1/2)2 · (4) · 2 + (1/2) · (10/11) · 2
]
+ [(1/2) · 2− (1/2) · 2 · (10/11)]·[(1/2) · (4) + 2]·(1/2)(1− 11/10)
11/21
·[(10/21) · (2) + (1/2) · (I − 1) · 4]
= [1/11]2 · 4 + [21/11] · 4 · [1 + 10/11] + [1/11] · 4 · −21
220
























21− I − 1
10
]}
which is negative if I exceeds two hundred and eleven.
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